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F1CTITIOUS REGISTRATION OF STOCK OWNERSIDP 
-HARTFORD v. WALSTON EXAMINED 
By 
mOMAS H. JOLLS• 
Williamsburg, Virginia 
The "fictitious payee" question, arising in connection with what we 
now call Commercial Paper, has been a fruitful source of litigation and 
commentary going back almost two centuries. In contrast, few contro-
versies have reached the courts where the insertion of a fictitious name 
as that of the stockholder in a stock certificate has created a problem. 
This is surprising. With approximately 25,000,000 stockholders in this 
country, .at least some of the recorded names are bound to be "ficti-
tious," the efforts of the Internal Revenue Service to the contrary not-
withstanding. "Fictitious" is used here in the sense that the name is an 
alias or alter ego of its creator, or may be chosen to provide a conduit 
for a transaction without any clear idea that the name represents any-
thing beyond that. A misspelled name is in a sense fictitious, but the 
identification with the real person can always be established. We can-
not, of course, call "fictitious" the common practice of institutional 
holders of registering securities in the names of nominees. Such names 
are, or should be, valid legal entities-generally the partnership device 
is used. 
The case which prompts this discussion, Hartford Accident & In-
demnity Co. v. Walston & Co.,l does not cite a single precedent directly 
in point, and apparently there is none. That the New York Courts did 
not find an easy answer is evidenced by the fact that the trial judge, 
and the Appellate Division by unanimous vote, found for the defend-
ant; the Court of Appeals held for the plaintiff in a 4 to 3 decision. 
THE FACTS 
The facts arose before the effective date of the Uniform Commercial 
Code in New York; insofar as the case was governed by statute, the 
New York Personal Property Law (substantially the Uniform Stock 
Transfer Act) applied. The purpose here is to analyze and comment 
upon the majority and minority opinions, and to indicate what changes 
might result from the application of the Code in any future such case. 
The two stock brokerage firms involved (in actuality the contest is 
• Member of the Illinois Bar; Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of 
Law, The College of William and Mary. 
1. 21 N. Y. 2d 219, 287 N. Y. S. 2d 58, 234 N. E. 2d 230 (1967); a/J'd on 
rehearing, 22 N.Y. 2d 672, 291 N.Y. S. 2d 366, 238 N. E. 2d 754 (1968). The 
case was commented on briefly in the Annual Survey of Code Developments, 
23 Bus. LAW 1057 (1969) and was thought worthy of expanded discussion be-
cause of its novelty. 
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probably one between insurers) will be referred to as Firm A and Firm 
B. Firm A was the holder and owner of stock certificates of three com-
panies, duly indorsed in blank by prior owners, which it desired to have 
transferred to its own name, either for its own account or for the ac-
count of customers. One Mais, a clerk for Firm A, had the duty of pre-
paring instructions and forwarding certificates to transfer agents. He 
inserted in the instructions the name "Jack Arbetell" as the transferee 
of these particular certificates, instead of the name of Firm A as he was 
supposed to do. Apparently this transmittal went forward in the routine 
of the hundreds or thousands of such transactions which a large bro-
kerage firm would be handling daily; the shares were transferred per 
instructions; when the new certificates came back to Firm A from the 
transfer agents, Mais took possession of them. An accomplice of his 
then presented himself to Firm B, seeking to sell the securities which 
Mais had placed in his hands; Firm B's employee or employees ac-
cepted a seemingly scanty identification of "Jack Arbetell," opened an 
account, took his indorsement, guaranteed the signature, and paid over 
the proceeds of sale ( $76,000). "Arbetell" was a non-existent person, 
at least if one is as willing as the majority of the court was to accept 
the somewhat inconclusive testimony of the thief, Mais, as to this vital 
fact. The fraud having been discovered, Firm A's assignee, its insurer, 
now sues Firm B for conversion. 
THE DECISION 
The majority opinion, favoring Firm B, is difficult to summarize be-
cause it concludes after reargument with a ground for decision which 
is remote from the question with which the opinion opens, viz: 
''The decision upon this appeal depends upon what is the duty 
of a broker member of the New York Stock Exchange to the 
owner of stolen shares of stock when delivered for sale and trans-
fer by the thief or one of its confederates." 
A totally different question is posed by the opening words of the dis-
senting opinion: 
"The issue is which of two regular stock-brokers should bear 
the loss resulting from the larcenous misappropriation from one 
of the brokers of corporate shares of stock." 
The conclusion of the original majority opinion (December 28, 
1967) seems to be that a new trial should be had to determine whether 
a real "Jack Arbetell" indorsed the certificates, and whether "good 
faith" on the part of Firm B was present. On the reargument, however, 
with the same minority of three dissenting, (July 2, 1968) it was con-
cluded in summary fashion that good faith of Firm B was not in issue 
between the parties; that the certificates in Arbetell's name had not 
been transferred in compliance with Section 162 of the Personal Prop-
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erty Law2 so as to effectively protect Firm B. Accordingly, Firm B 
was held liable in damages of $87,000.00 for conversion, without the 
necessity of the new trial called for by the original opinion. Thus the 
whole case turns on the validity of this indorsement. 
WHY THE DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE PREY AILED 
There could be four alternative bases on which the indorsements 
could be upheld: 
1. The Jack Arbetell who indorsed the certificates in Firm B's office 
is the person named therein, and is real; or 
2. "Jack Arbetell," fictional or real, is the nominee of the thieves, 
who were in a position to put anyone they chose in title as representing 
them; the indorsement running to a bona fide purchaser is not subject 
to challenge by a third party who never had title to these certificates, 
any more than it would be if the thieves had taken title in their own 
names and conveyed it by indorsement; or 
3. By analogy to the Negotiable Instruments Law, or to Section 
3-405 of the Uniform Commercial Code, or to the common law rules 
wJ:tich preceded them, these certificates can either be treated as trans-
ferable by the bearer, or as subject to being validly indorsed by any-
one, because "Jack Arbet~ll" was a fictitious person or one not in-
tended to have any interest in the certificates; or 
4. Firm A 'because of its identification, through its employee, with 
the fraud committed on issuers, and potential purchasers and signature 
guarantors, is estopped to raise any question as to the validity of the 
indorsements. Such estoppel cuts across Section 162 of the Personal 
Property Law.3 
ALTERNATIVES 1 AND 2 
These should be considered together because the evidence as to 
"Jack Arbetell" is so hazy that it cannot be segmented as favoring one 
theory or the other. All we have is the following, gleaned from the 
majority and minority opinions: 
Mais, the dishonest employee of Firm A, testified to the effect that 
the firm had no customer by the name of Jack Arbetell; that he knew 
of no person bearing that name; that he had never been given the right 
2. The relevant portion of Section 162 is: 
"Title to a certificate and to the shares represented thereby can be 
transferred only, 
(a) By delivery of the certificate indorsed either in blank or to a speci-
fied person by the person appearing by the certificate to be the owner 
of the shares represented thereby." 
3. Section 179 of the Personal Property Law provided as follows: 
"In any case not provided for by this article, the rules of law and equity, 
including the law merchant, and in particular the rules relating to the law 
of principal and agent, executors, administrators and trustees, and to the 
effect of fraud, misrepresentation, duress or coercion, mistake, bankruptcy 
or other invalidating cause, shall govern." 
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to use the name and had no reason to believe that there was such a 
person in existence. After removing the Arbetell certificates from Firm 
A's mail, he testified that he turned them over to a confederate named 
Yudelowitz. (This is the first and last mention of Yudelowitz.) Mais 
also testified that he had directed the certificates to be issued in the 
name of Arbetell on the instructions of his accomplices (not otherwise 
identified). A person calling himself Arbetell phoned Firm B, appeared 
at its office with the securities, opened an account there giving a bank 
reference and an address. He then indorsed the certificates, and in short 
order received and cashed checks for $76,000. At another point it is 
indicated he showed "one or two cards" with his name on them. 
This is the evidence, and it is strangely incomplete. Perhaps every-
one but Mais had skipped out. The plaintiff is suing to upset an in-
dorsement not its own, on a certificate it claims to own but to which it 
never had title of record. It would seem apparent that on the evidence 
it cannot be plausibly asserted, much less proven, that Arbetell was or 
was not real, or that the signature was or was not genuine. This is quite 
a different situation from that existing in the cases cited as supporting 
conversion.4 Plaintiff's claim arises only through tracing from cer-
tificates it formerly owned, and the burden should be on it to prove that 
the Arbetell certificates (of which it hopes to establish ownership) 
were not properly indorsed. Hence the conclusion of the original ma-
jority opinion that there should be a new trial. 
If Firm A were in a position to contend that "Jack Arbetell" was its 
nominee, or alias, or alter ego, its situation would be different. The 
transfer of the preceding certificates, standing in the names of others 
and indorsed in blank, was engineered by the thieves through Mais, 
and was a hostile and diversionary act so far as Firm A was concerned. 
This is where Mais' intention to shift title to the stock (at this time in 
X, Y and Z, the former owners) in favor of his group, and his insertion 
of a name to represent the group, prevails over any proprietary 
thoughts that Firm A's partners might at the time be thinking in favor 
of retaining their one-time dominion over the shares. When the firm 
turned over the job of giving instructions to transfer agents for effecting 
transfers of securities indorsed in blank, it necessarily assumed what-
ever risks were involved, against third parties, in Mais' choice of as-
signees. His choice was obviously limitless, unhampered by audit, as 
evidenced by his getting away with what he did. Suppose he had been 
instructed, for example, to transfer the stock to George Johnson, a 
firm customer with a New York address. There are thousands of 
George Johnsons in this country, and one of them happens to be a 
4. Casey v. Kastel, 237 N. Y. 305, 142 N. E. 671. 31 A. L. R. 995 ( 1924) 
(suit by a registered owner of a certificate, who had indorsed during infancy and 
now disaffirms); Pierpont v. Hoyt, 260 N. Y. 26, 182 N. E. 235, 83 A. L. R. 
1195 ( 1932) (suit by a registered owner of a certificate, whose indorsement had 
been forged). These cases were cited both in the original majority opinion, and 
in the opinion on the reargument. 
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friend of Mais', living in Philadelphia. He inserts the name "George 
Johnson" as assignee, intending his Philadelphia friend, and giving the 
Philadelphia address to the transfer agent. If he can get the certificate 
into the hands of the Philadelphia Johnson, the latter can indorse and 
transfer it with impunity and his signature is good because he is, out 
of the thousands of George J ohnsons, "the person appearing by the 
certificate to be the owner." The intent of the nominal assignors, X, 
Y and Z does not count-they have forgotten about the matter and 
could not care less; as to the issuer of the new certificate, its intent is 
only to follow the instructions shown in the assignment. 
ALTERNATIVE 3 
If "Jack Arbetell" was indeed a fictitious person, it can certainly be 
argued that the certificates required no indorsement, as being "bearer" 
like a Negotiable Instrument, or indorseable by anyone, as provided 
in the Code (Section 3-405) in either of which cases Firm B would 
have acquired a good title. The innumerable discussions of the "ficti-
tious payee" question which have taken place for almost two hundred 
years will not be reviewed here; divergent views are set forth in the 
opinions in the principal case. Authority for extension, or denial of 
extension, of the doctrine to the area of corporate stock has not been 
found. 5 If a court looks at the subject as a strictly statutory one, it has 
no difficulty in accepting the view of the majority opinion that there was 
no intent on the part of the "maker" (the court's candidate for this 
role being Firm A) to create or recognize "Jack Arbetell." Importation 
of the fictitious payee doctrine'into stock transfers requires what Judge 
Breitel in the minority opinion calls an "uninhibited approach"; any 
different attitude would reject the whole theory: First, on the basis that 
the Negotiable Instruments Law applies only to instruments payable in 
money; Second, on the basis suggested by the majority; Third, on the 
ground that the real maker is the issuer of the new certificate, or, 
alternatively, the assignor of .the old certificate, neither of whom has 
any intent whatever in the matter, or any means of forming an intent. 
However on the last point there is an analogy in a California case 
cited6 by the minority, holding that where a bank issues a cashier's 
check at the request of a corporation's faithless officer, the intent of 
such officer that the payee should have no interest would control, mak-
ing the checks bearer instruments. 
A truly uninhibited approach would be one which would borrow the 
ancient principles of the Law Merchant, based on the notion that one 
who launches "upon a sea of strangers" an instrument bearing a fake 
5. The point· is touched on in Stebbins v. The Phenix Fire Insurance Com-
pany, 3 Paige (N.Y.) 350 (1832), but inconclusively and by way of dictum. 
'6. Union Bank & Trust Co. of Los Angeles v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 8 
Cal. 2d 303,65 P 2d 355 (1937). Semble, Louisville Credit Men's Assn. v. Motors 
Investment Co., (Ky. Ct. of App. 1965) 394 S. W. 2d 760 (1965). 
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name denoting ownership, cannot turn his back on the victims. 7 The 
degree of involvement of Firm A in the "launching" here is discussed 
infra under Alternative 4. There has been considerable evolution in 
the original "fictitious payee" doctrine. After its origin in England 
growing out of a particular series of frauds which reached the courts 
in 1789, it was recognized as law in this country.8 The English Bills 
of Exchange Act was adopted in 1882, providing simply that "When 
the payee is fictitious or a non-existent person the bill may be treated 
as payable to bearer." Some of the American states proceeded to adopt 
statutes; then came the Negotiable Instruments Law; and finally the 
Code.9 Each of these involved some change but the basic premise re-
mained that the taker was not to be held guilty of negligence or bad 
faith because he failed to raise the question "Is the named owner of 
this commercial instrument a fake?" 
Seemingly there should be no problem in judicially adopting this 
principle in the securities field in order to prevent injustice, and there 
is no reason why it should have to come cluttered up with such con-
cepts as "intent of the maker" and "fictitious payee" which have no 
relevance to corporate stock. If the principle is adopted, it would be 
desirable to turn to the Code (Section 3-405) for the category "per-
son intended to have no interest in the instrument," rather than a "fic-
titious or non-existent person," once the Code has become part of the 
applicable body of law of the jurisdiction; also to adopt the Code solu-
tion of making the instrument indorseable by any person, instead of 
payable to "bearer" as under the N.I.L. In the principal case, the Court 
could have used whichever concept it chose under authority of Section 
179 of the Personal Property Law10 to moderate the literal require-
ments of Section 162.11 
ALTERNATiVE 4 
If the Court found the other alternatives not proved, or otherwise 
unacceptable, it could consider the broad ground of estoppel against 
Firm A on the basis of the firm's position in the creation of the situa-
tion which gave rise to the loss. The majority opinion says that Firm A 
had no knowledge of what" happened, and indicates that it has no re-
7. "Though the name of the payee was not known to the holder, yet since he 
took it on the credit of those whose names upon it to either of whom he might 
resort for payment, he could recover from the acceptor on the count for money 
paid and money had and received. In subsequent cases recovery was allowed on 
the count that the instrument was payable to bearer." See Minot v. Uibson, 3 
T. R. 481 (1789); affirmed 1 H. Bl. 569, 126 Eng. Rep. 326 (H. L. 1791). 
8. STORY, BILLS OF EXCHANGE, (4th ed. 1860). 
9. For a brief summary of developments from 1789 on, see FARNSWORTH, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL PAPER, 294, 295 ( 1968). 
A more detailed account appears in Kulp, The Fictitious Payee, 18 MICH. L. R. 
296 (1920). 
10. See note 3, supra. 
11. See note 2, supra. 
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sponsibility'because Mais was engaged in stealing from his employer. 
What is overlooked is that here we have a much more broad and com-
plex. scheme than one where an employee is simply helping himself 
from the till and only the employer can be hurt. Third parties are in-
volved, the first one being the issuer of the new securities. Where, 
within the scope of employment an agent or employee commits a fraud 
on a third party, then, just as in any other tort, the principal must bear 
the responsibility. Notice or knowledge is not an element of the prin-
cipal's liability, and is likely to be imputed to him in any event.l2 
Let us look at what happened. Mais would daily have been handed 
groups of stock certificates, many being indorsed in blank, accompa-
nied by tickets and memoranda as to desired disposition. Thereupon 
he would complete assignments and give covering instructions to vari-
ous transfer agents for the issuers as to the new stockholder names and 
respective numbers of shares to be inserted in new certificates. This 
procedure, though a proper and necessary one, does involve risk to the 
employer, for the employee, like one who is handed signed checks with 
the payee space left blank, has the power to fill in whatever name he 
chooses, and bind the employer. Each of the clerks doing this type of 
work is not, however, conducting a wholly one-man operation in secret 
-his work and the product of it flows through the channels of Firm 
A's organization, involving many hands-the messenger department; 
the mailing department,· the vault, the accounting department, and so 
on. Mais and his accomplices might have considered by-passing all 
these channels because of the risk of exposure; however had they done 
so and Mais had simply gone to Firm B or some other broker to sell 
the old certificates presently in his hands, technically negotiable be-
cause indorsed in blank, the risk of exposure would probably have 
been greater because of guarantees and other stamps on the old cer-
tificates which would indicate that they were some other broker's "work 
in process"; inquiries might be initiated which would lead to Firm A, 
and Mais (and perhaps even some of his highly elusive accomplices) 
would have been caught. However, if under the auspices of Firm A 
these items could be presented for transfer into the name of an ac-
complice or nominee of the gang, right along with Firm A's legitimate 
transfers, they would have created a "clean certificate" which would 
import no wrong, and as to which they could, as was demonstrated, 
provide a passable indorsement. Thus these fraudulent transactions, 
necessarily transmitted on Firm A's letterhead, went out through its 
messenger or mailing departments to three separate transfer agents, 
were transferred and the new certificates were mailed to, or picked up 
by messengers from, Firm A. The rights of the plaintiff can rise no 
higher than those of its assignor, Firm A, and it is difficult to see how 
12. MECHEM, AGENCY (1889) §739; Gleason v. Seaboard AirlineR. R., 278 
U. S. 349, 49 S. Ct. 161, 73 L. Ed. 415 (1929); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY §§261, 262, 282(2) (a). 
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Firm A could be allowed to come into court and maintain that it had 
no knowledge, no notice, and no responsibility as to diversion of the 
shares, and that as against recipients in the stream of commerce, the 
name "Jack Arbetell" is a secret representation of its ownership. 
FRAUD ON THE ISSUER AS SUPPORTING ESTOPPEL 
The presentation for transfer under the auspices of Firm A was a 
warranty by Firm A that the transfer was rightfu1.13 Had the transfer 
agents been placed on notice that the transferee was fictitious or non-
existent, almost certainly the transfer would have been refused.14 While 
the issuer cannot pick and choose its stockholders it has three interests 
which the law should protect: (1) disassociation from the conse-
quences of any fraud that may result from fictitious ownership; (2) 
responsibility growing out of its statement in the new certificate "This 
certifies that Jack Arbetell is the owner of 100 shares of common stock 
of X Corporation"; and (3) the right to decline issuance in a fictitious 
name which is neutralized for purposes of voting and otherwise par-
ticipating in corporate affairs, and which could conceivably involve 
enough shares to make it impossible for a merger, for example, to be 
voted. The corporation has a right and duty to defend the integrity of 
its stockholder records. It is completely impracticable, and the law 
should not require, that the issuer conduct an investigation into the 
existence, identity, and capacity of assignees of stock; of necessity, the 
burden must fall on the presentor for transfer. This might be a good 
context for the extension and amplification of Rule 405 "Know your 
customer." 
THE PREFERABLE GROUND FOR DECISION 
It is submitted that the Court erred in, without at least requiring 
more convincing proof of the facts concerning Arbetell, deciding that 
the indorsement was insufficient under Section 162 of the Personal 
Property Law; also in taking a strictly legalistic view of that Section 
as permitting transfer only upon the actual indorsement of the person 
13. CHRISTY, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK §248 (4th ed. 1967): 
"When the purchaser presents his transfer and certificate, the transfer 
officer naturally understands that he claims the transfer to be valid, and 
to have a right to a certificate; he has the right to act as if this had been 
said in terms. And if relying upon such tacit and implied representations, 
the corporation suffers a loss, the purchaser who misled it is liable." (cit-
ing cases). 
14. CHRISTY, supra, note 13, §70: 
"If the transfer is made and a new certificate issued in the name of the 
non-existent or fictitious person, the corporation may be liable on a repre-
sentation that such person is capable of transferring the stock." 
See Code Section 3-413 applying to Commercial Paper, whereby the maker 
admits the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse. See also (as 
to corporate stock) Amer. Exchange Nat!. Bank v. Woodlawn Cemetery Co., 
120 App. Div. 119, 105 N.Y. S. 305 (1907); Holbrook v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 
57 N.Y. 616 (1874). 
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named in the certificate. During the many years that Section 162 was 
-in effect, transfer agents have not hesitated to apply supplemental prin-
ciples of law, as sanctioned by Section 179, in disregard of1the literalv 
language of Section 162. The present case seems one calling for estop-
pel against the plaintiff, and there seems ample authority in New York 
for the application of the estoppel principle. "As between two innocent 
victims of the fraud the one who made po~sible the fraud on the other 
should suffer."15 
The foregoing is not an attempt to divine a precise assessment of 
fault as between two highly reputable firms, caught in the problem of 
acute shortage of clerical help and unable to assure themselves that all 
of their people are honest and competent.16 
A HYPOTHETICAL CASE-COULD MAIS HAVE SOLD 
THE STOCK TWICE? 
There appears no convincing evidence of Arbetell's non-existence, 
and the Court does not find his non-existence. Suppose, a£ter Firm B 
pays the $87,000 conversion judgment against it, Arbetell shows up 
looking for his stock. It seems that early in 1960 and immediately prior 
to the transactions in suit, Arbetell, who was an old Army friend of , 
Mais from Alaska, came in to see him and told of his $100,000 cash 
inheritance and his desire to use Mais' advice and expertise in making 
stock investments. Mais is able to put his hands on $76,000 worth of 
stock (his story about Yudelowitz et al. is a fabrication); this stock he 
puts in Arbetell's name (per the Court's opinion) only he receives 
$76,000 from Arbetell for it, and bands him the certificates. Arbetell 
is ignorant in financial matters, but is acting in good faith. He says he 
is going on a round-the-world cruise on a freighter; Mais points out 
the problems of stock ownership in absentia and persuades him to turn 
back the certificates to him (Mais) for safekeeping. Arbetellleaves; 
Mais forges his indorsement on the certificates and (now picking up 
the thread of the original story) sells them through a_,confederate to 
Firm B for $76,000, making his total takings $152,000. He also de-
cides to go on a trip. Firm A now discovers its loss and sues Firm B 
for conversion. The court (as happened) enters a judgment for 
$87,000 against Firm B. Arbetell comes back; proves from the issuer's 
records his ownership of the stock, and sues the issuer for wrongful 
transfer on the forged assignment; the issuer sues Firm B on the sig-
nature guarantee. Neither has any defense; the former proceeding 
certainly is not binding on Arbetell; .it now is evident that A had 
15. Hall v. Bank of Blasdell, 306 N.Y. 336, 118 N. E. 2d 464 (1954); Zend-
' man v. Harry Winston, Inc. 305 N. Y. 180, 111 N. E. 2d 871 (1953); Island 
Trading Co. v. Berg Bros., 239 N.Y. 229, 146 N. E. 345 (1924). 
16. Exchanges Ask Access to Fingerprint Data to Check Employees as Stock 
Thefts Rise, Wall St. J. (Eastern Ed.) Mar. 5. 1969, at 3, col. 2-3: "Securities 
with a total value of about $37 million have been reported stolen or lost in each 
of the last two years." 
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neither title nor the right to possession, as claimed. Arbetell was the 
registered owner, and a bona fide purchaser as well. If the Statute of 
Limitations has not run, Firm B has the ultimate liability on its guar-
antee and must now pay a second judgment, with no apparent recourse 
against anyone. If the statute has run, the innocent issuer will have to 
pay. The only variance from the original story is that Mais is shown 
not to have been telling the truth. 
A fundamental weakness in the "fictitious payee" doctrine is the · 
necessity that puts the t:vidence in the mouth of the wrongdoer. To 
prove that someone (excluding one known to have lived and whose 
death can be legally established) is a non-person takes quite a bit of 
doing. For an interesting case where a Court could have found itself 
in the position indicated by the above hypothetical in a negotiable 
instruments lawsuit,. it having previously declared the non-existence of 
a person to have been conclusive~ proved, see Louisville Credit Mens 
Assn. v. The Louisville Trust CoP 
WHAT RESULT IF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE HAD BEEN APPLICABLE? 
Firm A's action for conversion against Firm B would be governed 
by Section 8-318 of the Code, which provides: 
No Conversion by good faith delivery 
An agent or bailee who in good faith (including observance of 
reasonable commercial standards if he is in the business of buying, 
selling or otherwise dealing with securities) has received securities 
and sold, pledged or delivered them according to the instructions of 
his principal is not liable for conversion or for participation in breach 
of fiduciary duty although the principal had no right to dispose of 
them." 
In the original majority opinion the Court stated that the obligation 
to observe reasonable commercial standards is an element of "good 
faith" under Section 168 of the Personal Property Law. However in the 
later opinion of July 2, 1968, having already decided that the transfer 
to Firm B was invalid under Section 162, the Court determined that 
Firm B's "good faith is not an issue in this case and we do not reach 
it." The original majority opinion made some observations on the sub-
ject of good faith, but no findings, leaving the subject for retrial. The 
possibility of retrial was cut off by the opinion of July 2, 1968. 
Assuming that Firm B could prevail on the "good faith" issue, 
clearly Firm A would have no recovery·against Firm B in conversion 
under the Code. Almost surely the certificates standing in Arbetell's 
name, after their receipt by Firm B, would have been transferred to 
bona fide purchasers. Issuance of new certificates to such purchasers 
17. (Ky. Ct. of App. 1967) 422 S. W. 2d 421. 
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would cut off any right to reclaim or other remedy on the part of Firm 
A (Sections 8-311 and 8-315). Firm A having made the presentn:J.ent 
for transfer of the certificates antecedent to the issuance of the Arbetell 
certificates, and having thereby warranted its entitlement to the transfer 
(Section 8-306) would certainly be in no position to hold the issuer 
liable for following its instructions to issue them in Arbetell's name. 
This leaves Firm A without a remedy against anyone, and inasmuch as -
it started the trouble in the first place, this seems about the way it 
should be. 
If Firm B is held not to have observed reasonable commercial 
standards, Firm A should be required to surmount the issues of its 
own title and right to possession in order to recover the value of the 
stock. A defense by Firm B on the "fictitious ownership" principle 
based on Code Section 3-405 relating to Commercial Paper is prob-
ably weaker than that already argued on pre-Code law, because it can 
now be argued that in promulgating the Code as a body of commercial 
law dealing comprehensively with Commercial Paper in Article 3, and 
Investment Securities in Article 8, the draftsmen while compartmenting 
these subjects would have put something relating to fictitious owner-
ship in Article 8 if they had felt that similar treatment was indicated. 
On the other hand, the argument infra in favor of holding that Firm· 
A is estopped by its conduct from questioning the title to anomalous 
certificates which Firm A had a hand in creating, is probably even 
stronger under the Code than the one under the Personal Property 
Law to the effect that its general Section 179 overrides a literal reading 
of Section 162.18 Under the Code one could cite Section 1-103, which 
specifically refers to estoppel, to "supplement" Section 8-308 defining 
the "appropriate person" to indorse.19 Both Code provisions are bet-
ter drafted than the statutes which preceded them, ·and their purpose 
is clear. A Court should have no difficulty in finding, under appropri-
ate facts, that one in the position of Firm A is estopped to deny the 
effectiveness of the "Jack Arbetell" endorsement, with the result that 
no conversion has occurred. 
18. See notes 2 and 3, supra. 
19. Section 1-103 provides: 
"Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the prin-
ciples of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative 
to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepre-
sentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or in-
validating cause shall supplement its provisions." 
It has been stated in a case citing this section and holding a principal estopped 
to deny his agent's representations that "these provisions superimpose a general 
requirement of fundamental integrity in commercial transactions regulated by the 
Code." Skeels v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. 335 F. 2d 846 (1964). 
Section 8-308 establishes the requirement of indorsement by an "appropriate 
person" and goes on to define this term at length, including the catch-all "(f) a 
person having power to sign under applicable law or controlling instrument." 

